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NO. 20 APRIL 2019 Introduction 
The “Deal of the Century” 
for Israel-Palestine 
US Proposals Are Likely to Speed Demise of Two-State Settlement 
Muriel Asseburg 
US President Donald Trump has announced a “deal of the century” to resolve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The plan is to be revealed at an undetermined date some-
time after the Israeli parliamentary elections. While the details remain a well-kept 
secret, the US Administration’s record to date suggests that the initiative will priori-
tise Israeli interests over Palestinian rights, ignore fundamental principles of inter-
national law, and steer well away from the idea of two sovereign states. The Palestinian 
leadership’s rejection must therefore be expected. The incoming Israeli government 
is likely to treat that as a green light to implement those elements of the plan that 
serve to maintain its permanent control over East Jerusalem and strategic areas of 
the West Bank. This course also risks breakdown of the already precarious Israeli-Pal-
estinian cooperation on conflict management. The EU and its member states should 
take the publication of the US plan as an occasion to spell out the principles of the 
kind of conflict resolution that they could support, and state the consequences for 
European policy of Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank. 
 
Trump was already proclaiming an “ulti-
mate deal” to end the Israel-Palestine con-
flict during his presidential campaign in 
2016. Since he took office a trio composed 
of his son-in-law Jared Kushner, Jason 
Greenblatt, long-time confidant and chief 
legal officer to Trump’s business empire, 
and US ambassador to Israel David Fried-
man have been working on such a plan. 
The US State Department, however, has not 
been involved. Alongside the so-called final 
status issues to be agreed between the two 
parties to the conflict – Jerusalem, refu-
gees, settlements, status and borders of the 
Palestinian entity, and security – Trump’s 
team appears to be focussing above all on 
economic cooperation and development in 
the Palestinian territories. This would make 
the US plan largely a redux of Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s preferred 
option of “economic peace”. That means 
massive investment in the Palestinian econo-
my as a substitute for self-determination with-
in a sovereign state. The Arab Gulf states 
and neighbouring Egypt and Jordan are 
meant to play a special role in this scheme, 
providing it with a political umbrella and/ 
or underpinning it with financial support. 
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The overriding goal is to put together a 
coalition in which Israel cooperates closely 
with Arab regional powers and the United 
States against Iran. Recent years have already 
witnessed a noticeable rapprochement be-
tween Israel and the Arab Gulf states. Now 
Israel and the United States want to remove 
the Palestinian hurdle that has to date pre-
vented a complete normalisation of rela-
tions. 
Elements of the Deal 
Washington has revealed neither the ap-
proach nor the details of the “deal of the 
century”, which is supposed to serve as 
the basis for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. 
Yet, as far as the substance is concerned, 
a number of inferences can be drawn 
from the Administration’s actions and 
pronouncements. The most basic of these 
is that Trump refuses to unequivocally 
back a two-state settlement and refrains 
from clearly condemning Israel’s settlement 
policy in the occupied territories. US Am-
bassador Friedman makes no secret of his 
closeness to settler leaders. Washington has 
also ceased describing the Palestinian terri-
tories (and the Golan Heights) as “occu-
pied”, for example in the US State Depart-
ment’s 2018 Human Rights Report. 
Moreover, President Trump has begun 
to question the international consensus on 
final status issues (as laid out for example 
in UN Security Council Resolution 2334 of 
December 2016). As Trump himself put it, 
he “took Jerusalem off the table”. While he 
did note that recognition of Jerusalem as 
Israel’s capital did not prejudice a negotiated 
agreement on the border between Israel and 
the Palestinians, all practical steps taken 
by the Americans point to an anticipated 
outcome denying the Palestinians sover-
eignty over central neighbourhoods of East 
Jerusalem: moving the US embassy to Jeru-
salem, closing the consulate-general in East 
Jerusalem (which had mainly been re-
sponsible for the Palestinians) and termi-
nating financial support for Palestinian 
institutions in the city. 
Trump also recognised Israeli sovereignty 
over the Syrian Golan Heights occupied 
in 1967. While not relating directly to the 
Palestinian territories, the move signals that 
the Trump Administration does not neces-
sarily feel bound by the international law 
principle outlawing acquisition of territory 
by force. And the Israeli right interprets this 
as green light for annexations in the West 
Bank. 
In 2018 Washington also stopped fund-
ing the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA). The United States had been 
by far the largest contributor, covering 
about one-third of UNRWA’s total budget in 
recent years. The background to this is that 
the Trump Administration shares the Israeli 
government’s view that UNRWA perpetu-
ates the refugee problem by encouraging 
refugees to insist on their status and right 
of return rather than integrating within 
their current host states. According to press 
reports, Washington has also demanded 
that Jordan strip Palestinians living there of 
refugee status and instead naturalise them. 
Accelerating Erosion 
Since Trump took office, Israelis and Pales-
tinians have moved further away from a 
two-state settlement. Instead the one-state 
reality has become even more deeply en-
trenched: Israel enjoys overriding control of 
the entire region between the River Jordan 
and the Mediterranean, while the Palestin-
ian Authority (PA) plays deputy sheriff. 
There have been no peace talks since April 
2014. Backing by the Trump Administration 
and a warming of relations with the Arab 
Gulf states have encouraged Netanyahu’s 
right-wing/national-religious coalition to 
expand settlement activity in the West 
Bank and Jerusalem, to open the way to 
annexation of settlements, to expand the 
Jewish population share in Jerusalem and 
to strengthen the Jewish identity of the 
state of Israel. These objectives were pur-
sued by a string of bills introduced to the 
Knesset since 2017 (some of which have 
 SWP Comment 20 
 April 2019 
 3 
been placed on hold or overturned by the 
High Court). In March 2017 Israel’s security 
cabinet authorised – for the first time in 
twenty-five years – an entirely new settle-
ment in the central West Bank. Represen-
tatives of the governing parties reject a sov-
ereign Palestinian state and argue increas-
ingly vehemently for annexation of Area C 
of the West Bank (about 60 percent by area) 
or even the entire West Bank. In the 2019 
election campaign Netanyahu also stated 
his intention to expand Israeli sovereignty 
to parts of the West Bank. 
In the absence of a perspective of conflict 
resolution, Israeli-Palestinian cooperation 
on conflict management has further eroded 
over the last few years. Clashes over the 
Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif have fre-
quently escalated, requiring Jordanian 
mediation to restore calm. More than 180 
Palestinians have been shot dead by Israeli 
soldiers since late March 2018, in the course 
of the “Great March of Return” protests at 
the Gaza border fence; thousands more 
have been injured, many seriously. On the 
Israeli side incendiary kites and firebombs 
thrown over the border fence have caused 
material damage including destroying agri-
cultural crops. Increasingly frequent rocket 
and artillery exchanges between Israel and 
radical groups in Gaza have repeatedly 
brought the coastal strip to the verge of 
war. While Egypt and the UN were able to 
mediate short-term ceasefires to calm the 
situation and somewhat soften Gaza’s 
closure, a long-term ceasefire, security 
guarantees and the lifting of the blockade 
have proven unachievable. Consequently 
the humanitarian crisis in Gaza drags on. 
The process of erosion would accelerate 
still further if the Palestinian leadership 
were to decide to implement the decisions 
of the PLO Central Council, which has in 
recent years repeatedly voted to suspend 
security cooperation with Israel. Today 
combined US and Israeli pressure has cre-
ated a situation where the very existence of 
the PA is at stake. In 2018 the United States 
ended its financial support for the PA and 
Palestinian civil society and in early autumn 
closed the PLO’s office in Washington D.C. 
While US support for the Palestinian secu-
rity forces was actually supposed to con-
tinue, the PA felt forced to reject it from 
January 2019 in order to avoid risking pros-
ecution under the US Anti-Terrorism Clarifi-
cation Act (ATCA). 
In February the PA lost another signifi-
cant source of income. In the course of 
the election campaign the Israeli cabinet 
decided to apply the so-called Stern Law. 
Under the motto “No pay for slay” this cuts 
Israel’s transfer payments to the PA (an ele-
ment of the 1994 Israeli-Palestinian Proto-
col on Economic Relations) by the amount 
paid by the PA during the previous year 
to Palestinians imprisoned in Israel (all in-
discriminately labelled “terrorists”) and to 
the families of “martyrs”. In response the 
PA refused to accept the reduced transfers. 
As a result, according to UN figures, it lacks 
about two thirds of its income. In the ab-
sence of a rapid political solution to this 
problem, this is likely to lead to the rapid 
financial collapse of the PA. 
Other moderating institutions have been 
dismantled too. In January 2019 Netanyahu 
decided to end the Temporary International 
Presence in Hebron (TIPH), an observer mis-
sion that had worked since 1994 – with 
few interruptions – to deescalate between 
Palestinians and radical settlers in the old 
city. This is likely to accelerate the quarter’s 
transformation through settlement activity, 
displacement of the Palestinian population 
and emphasis of Jewish over Islamic cul-
tural heritage. The level of violence has 
already increased noticeably since the mis-
sion’s withdrawal. 
Assessment and 
Recommendations 
The American “deal of the century” is un-
likely to contribute meaningfully to resolv-
ing the Israel-Palestine conflict. Instead it 
risks further escalating an already tense 
situation and accelerating the erosion of 
joint conflict management. Even under 
strong pressure, the Palestinian leadership 
cannot be expected to agree to the US ap-
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proach. In response to Trump’s recognition 
of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Pales-
tinians rejected any further mediation by 
Washington, and have since then refused 
high-level contacts with the US Middle East 
team. At any rate, the Palestinian leader-
ship is divided, and President Mahmoud 
Abbas possesses neither the legitimacy to 
negotiate meaningful compromises nor 
the authority to implement any agreement. 
Israel’s incoming government can be ex-
pected to treat a Palestinian “no” to nego-
tiations on the basis of the US plan as a 
green light to selectively and unilaterally 
implement those elements of the initiative 
that permit it to maintain permanent con-
trol over East Jerusalem and strategic parts 
of the West Bank. As the Knesset election 
is likely to produce another right-wing/ 
national-religious coalition there is a seri-
ous risk that the latter will feel emboldened 
to initiate de-jure annexation of Area C of 
the West Bank. That would permanently 
shrink the Palestinian territory to a few 
isolated enclaves. A two-state settlement 
would then no longer be conceivable. 
The EU and its member states should 
spell out the principles against which any 
blueprint must be measured if it is to con-
tribute to a lasting resolution of the con-
flict: fulfilment of the right to national self-
determination of both peoples, guarantee 
of individual human rights for the entire 
population between the River Jordan and 
the Mediterranean, and implementation of 
the right of return in a form that respects 
both the individual choice of the Palestin-
ian refugees and the interests of states in 
which they will be permanently (re-)settled. 
Europe should not support any aspect of 
the US plan unless it fulfils these criteria. 
In particular – as the experience of the 
past twenty-five years underlines – even 
massive investment cannot achieve eco-
nomic development in the Palestinian 
territories as long as the obstacles associated 
with the occupation remain in place (above 
all mobility restrictions, permit procedures 
and theft of natural resources). What is 
more, the obligations Israel would incur if 
it annexed parts (or all) of the West Bank 
need to be clearly stated, as do the expected 
responses from the European side. In that 
context, Europe should not be available to 
fund prolonged occupation or annexation. 
Dr Muriel Asseburg is Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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